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The relative contribution of a sector to poverty reduction is shown to depend on its direct and 
indirect ‘growth effects’ as well as its ‘participation effect’.  The paper assesses how these effects 
compare between agriculture and non-agriculture by reviewing the literature and by analyzing 
cross-country national accounts and poverty data from household surveys.  Special attention is 
given to Sub-Saharan Africa.  While the direct growth effect of agriculture on poverty reduction is 
likely to be smaller than that of non-agriculture (though not because of inherently inferior 
productivity growth), the indirect growth effect of agriculture (through its linkages with non-
agriculture) appears substantial and at least as large as the reverse feedback effect.  The poor 
participate much more in growth in the agricultural sector, especially in low-income countries, 
resulting in much larger poverty reduction impact.  Together, these findings support the overall 
premise that enhancing agricultural productivity is the critical entry-point in designing effective 
poverty reduction strategies, including in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Yet, to maximize the poverty 
reducing effects, the right agricultural technology and investments must be pursued, underscoring 
the need for much more country specific analysis of the structure and institutional organization of 
the rural economy in designing poverty reduction strategies. 
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While it has long been recognized that economic development is inextricably linked to 
agriculture, there has been little consensus about its precise role.  The dual economy models 
inspired by Lewis (1954) and popular in development economics in the 1960s and the 1970s 
typically featured agriculture as a backward, subsistence sector.  In this view, resources were to be 
drawn from the unproductive agricultural sector to encourage development of the productive 
industrial sector.  Much of the early development economics literature was thus interpreted as 
supporting an industrialization strategy, leading to an urban bias in development planning (Lipton, 
1977), and fiscal and trade systems that systematically over-taxed agriculture (Krueger et al., 1988). 
A more positive view on the role of agriculture in development (especially during the early 
stages) emerged later, following the seminal contributions by Johnston and Mellor (1961) and 
Schultz (1964).  They emphasized the critical contributions of the agricultural sector to growth in 
the non-agricultural sectors, implying that investments and policy reforms in agriculture might 
actually yield faster overall economic growth, even though agriculture itself might grow at a slower 
pace than non-agriculture.  Since then several authors have found that the multiplier effects from 
agriculture to non-agriculture are indeed substantial, especially in Asia, but also in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) (Haggblade, Hammer and Hazell, 1991; Delgado et al., 1998).  The experience of the 
Green Revolution in Asia, whereby traditional agriculture was rapidly transformed into a fast 
growing modern sector through the adoption of science based technology, provided further 
confidence in the proposition of agriculture as an engine of growth. 
More recently, the development community has shifted its focus from fostering economic 
growth per se to maximizing poverty reduction, or achieving ‘shared’ growth—growth with a 
maximum pay-off in terms of poverty reduction (World Bank, 2005a).  This has added a new 
dimension to the debate about the relative role of agriculture versus non-agriculture, as poverty 
reduction not only depends on the rate of overall economic growth, but also on the ability of poor 
1  Introduction     3 3
people to connect to that growth (i.e. the ‘quality’ of growth).  As the majority of poor people in the 
developing world (and especially in SSA) depend directly on agriculture for their livelihood, it is 
often argued that agricultural growth has a higher return in terms of poverty reduction (i.e. a higher 
‘participation effect’) than an equal amount of growth in non-agriculture. 
Both the growth and the participation effects continue to be hotly debated for each sector, 
especially in the African context.  On the growth side, some contend that agricultural productivity 
growth is central to sustainable economic development (Mellor, 1976; Timmer, 2005).  Others hold 
that for Africa at least, the classical intersectoral linkages no longer apply, and a pro-agriculture 
strategy will not deliver the overall growth necessary for rapid poverty reduction.  On the 
participation side, the sheer weight of numbers, with the majority of poor people depending on 
agriculture, suggests that agriculture will deliver a greater participation effect.  But it is also argued 
that African agricultural development will not involve the majority of poor smallholder farmers, but 
can only succeed among larger commercial farmers (Maxwell, 2004).  The extent to which poor 
people would gain from a pro-agriculture strategy is questionable in this view. 
Understanding how these counterbalancing forces play out in terms of poverty reduction 
across sectors is central to the development of effective poverty reducing strategies.  Yet, to further 
this debate, an empirical perspective is needed, focusing on three key questions:  1) Do investment 
and policy reform in agriculture enhance overall growth more than investment and policy reform in 
non-agriculture?  2) Is participation by the poor in agricultural growth on average higher than their 
participation in non-agricultural growth, and if so, under what conditions?  3) If a focus on 
agriculture would tend to yield slower overall growth, but larger participation by the poor, 
compared with a focus on non-agriculture, which strategy would tend to have the largest pay-off in 
terms of poverty reduction, and under which circumstances? 
These are the central issues addressed in this paper.  To do so, it complements the empirical 
insights from the literature on historical experiences in Asia and Latin America (Ravallion and 
Datt, 1996, 2002; Bravo-Ortega and Lederman, 2005; World Bank, 2005b) with cross-country     4 4
analysis using national accounts evidence on sectoral growth combined with poverty data from 
household surveys.  Special attention is given to SSA, though the evidence we bring to the debate 
covers the wider developing world. 
The paper begins by developing a simple conceptual framework (section 2) in which the 
effects of agriculture and non-agriculture on poverty are shown to arise from two principal sources: 
a growth effect and a participation effect.  The paper then examines the direct and indirect growth 
effects across both sectors in sections 3 and 4, followed by an assessment of potential differences in 
the participation component in section 5.  Section 6 synthesizes how these different effects are 
expected to play out in terms of poverty reduction across different groups of countries and 
concludes.  
 
Let Pi be any (decomposable) measure of poverty and Yi per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in country i.  The proportionate change in poverty in a country i can then be seen to be 
identical to the GDP elasticity of poverty (defined as the proportionate change in poverty divided 
by the proportionate change in per capita GDP)
3
























≡         (1) 
We refer to the first multiplicative term in (1) as the participation effect and the second 
multiplicative term as the growth effect. 
Not all growth processes generate an equal amount of overall growth nor an equal amount 
of poverty reduction (World Bank, 2000).  The growth and participation effects may differ 
substantially across sectors.  The latter has been illustrated empirically for India by Ravallion and 
                                                 
3 Note, by using GDP growth rather than mean household income change as is common in this sort of identity, we are 
very much focusing on the overall growth process (not simply the growth in household income).  The elasticity concept 
used here reflects the impact of growth on both average incomes of households and how those incomes are distributed.  
This is commonly referred to as the “growth elasticity of poverty” which is strictly speaking not correct. 
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Datt (1996; 2002) and for China by Ravallion and Chen (2004).  To accommodate such differences, 
we rewrite (1) as a weighted sum of the contributions to poverty reduction of both the agricultural 











































≡ ) 1 (      (2) 
with a denoting agriculture, n non-agriculture, and q any constant (1<q<0).  A meaningful choice 
for q is q=(Yai/Yi)=sai the share of agriculture in total GDP in country i.  It follows that (1-q) equals 













































≡      (3) 
Using lower cases to represent rates of change for Pi and Yi gives: 
pi ≡ εaisai yai + εnisni yni        (4) 
where yki is the growth rate of per capita GDP in sector k=a,n, εki the elasticity of total poverty with 
respect to per capita GDP in sector k, and ski the share of sector k in total GDP. 
From equation (4) it is clear that the impact of a sector (e.g. agriculture) on poverty depends 
on how its pace of growth performs compared with the other sector (non-agriculture).  In addition, 
a large literature exists, showing that accelerating agricultural growth will induce changes in other 
sectors, resulting in higher non-agriculture growth.  While the reverse interaction might also hold, 
the literature suggests that these effects are smaller.  The growth effect of a sector therefore will 
have two components:  the direct contribution (or the size of ya) and an indirect effect, this being 
additional changes in poverty resulting from the induced change in the growth performance of the 
other sector (the effect of ya on yn). 
In addition, an acceleration in the pace of per capita agricultural growth (ya) will have a 
more marked effect on poverty than an identical increase in the rate of non-agricultural growth (yn) 
if εnsn < εasa..  The participation effect therefore has two elements: an elasticity component and a 
share component.  Even though agriculture is the largest sector in the economy of most developing     6 6
countries, the share of non-agriculture (services and industry combined) in the overall economy is 
usually larger than the share of agriculture.  Whether the participation effect of agriculture (εasa) 
outweighs the participation effect of non-agriculture (εnsn) would then depend on whether εa is 
sufficiently larger than εn.  Finally, note that when εn=εa, equation (4) collapses to equation (1) and 
the source of growth no longer matters in determining the poverty effect of growth (Ravallion and 
Datt, 1996).  We return to this property of equation (4) in developing an empirical test to assess 
whether the GDP elasticity of poverty differs across sectors. 
In sum, from this simple framework, we identify two elements each of the growth and 
participation effects.  The growth effect has a direct and indirect component; and the participation 
effect has an elasticity and a share component.  A schematic representation is given in Figure 1. All 
four components have to be taken into account when considering the relative contribution of a 
sector in poverty reduction.
4  In what follows, we compare the size of each of these effects (as 
represented by the box and arrow size in Figure 1) across both sectors and empirically explore the 
overall contribution of each sector to poverty reduction across countries during 1980-2000. 
 
Figure 1: The relative role of agricultural and non-agricultural growth in reducing poverty. 
 
                                                 
4  In addition to these four effects, there might also be population reallocation effects taking place between the sectors 
which could further contribute to poverty reduction (also referred to as the ‘Kuznets process by Anand and Kanbur 
(1985) and Ravallion and Datt (1996)).  We have not pursued this in our decomposition here given the empirical 
challenge of estimating poverty by sector, as rural households are often involved in both agricultural and non-
agricultural activities.  We refer to Ravallion and Huppi (1991) who explore a decomposition of the proportionate 
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A review of the historical overall sectoral growth rates since 1960 across countries in the 
world (Table 1) indicates that on average agricultural growth has lagged non-agricultural growth 
rates, in line with common wisdom.  The difference amounts on average to 1.6 percentage points.  
Looking across continents, the gap is largest in South and East Asia and smallest in the Middle 
Eastern and North African countries.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, the average gap has historically been 
1.2 percentage points, somewhat below the world average.  The decline in agricultural growth rates 
over the past 4 decades—from 2.7 percent in the 1960s to 2.0 percent in the 1990s—was 
accompanied by an even larger decline in non-agricultural growth rates, from 5.7 percent to 3.1 
percent in the 1990s, or 4 percent on average during the early 2000s.  
The lower observed growth rates in agriculture versus non-agriculture have led many 
policymakers to be skeptical about the potential role of agriculture in development and poverty 
reduction strategies.  Common wisdom further holds that observed agricultural growth rates have 
not only been historically lower than growth rates outside agriculture, but more importantly, that 
overall productivity growth in agriculture is also inherently inferior to overall productivity growth 
in non-agriculture.  This widely held view, though there are important dissenters
5, goes back to the 
classical economists, starting with Adam Smith, who posited that due to greater impediments to 
specialization and labor division in agricultural production compared with manufacturing, 
productivity in agriculture was bound to grow at a slower pace than in manufacturing. 
                                                 
5  These are for example North (1959), Johnston and Mellor (1961), Hayami and Ruttan (1985), and Timmer (1997). 
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Table 1: Agricultural and non-agricultural growth rates by decade and continent between 
1960 and 2003. 
Average annual 
growth rate (%) 
1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-2000 2000-2003  Total 














2.7 5.0 2.5 5.5 2.6 3.4 2.7 3.0 2.7 3.6 2.6 3.8 
South  Asia  2.9 5.7 1.7 4.7 3.6 6.4 3.2 6.2 3.0 5.9 2.9 5.8 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
4.0 7.7 3.2 7.4 3.0 4.9 1.7 5.1 0.1 5.0 2.3 5.7 
East Europe & 
Central Asia 
-1.4 7.0 1.7 7.0 1.3 3.3 -0.7 0.0 3.4 6.7 0.8 2.6 
Europe,  others  1.2 6.0 1.7 3.5 2.0 2.6 1.7 2.5 -0.8 2.3 1.5 2.9 
Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
2.8 5.2 2.3 5.0 1.5 1.6 1.9 3.3 2.2 2.0 2.0 3.3 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
1.3 6.1 6.0 7.3 4.8 3.0 3.9 4.2 4.4 3.7 4.4 4.7 
North  America  -  -  -0.3 3.7 3.2 2.7 2.7 2.7 -1.8 3.2 1.7 3.0 
Total  2.7 5.7 2.6 5.3 2.5 3.2 2.0 3.1 2.1 4.0 2.3 3.9 
Both annual agricultural and non-agricultural growth rates are based on GDP expressed in constant 2000 US$.  Non-agricultural 
growth is defined as the sector weighted sum of GDP growth in industry and services. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank data (2005c) 
 
Despite the powerful appeal of this view throughout the development economics literature
6 
and among policy makers, there are few comparable estimates available of productivity growth in 
agriculture and industry, especially for developing countries.
7  In a first simple step to explore this 
further, we decompose the sectoral GDP growth rates reported in Table 1 into their (labor) 
productivity and population growth components (see Table 2).
8  Table 2 presents the average 
sectoral growth rates and their (labor) productivity and population growth components during the 
1960-2003 period. 
Contrary to the widely held assumption that improvements in agricultural productivity 
cannot match those in non-agriculture, the results in Table 2 suggest that over the past 4 decades 
labor productivity in agriculture has on average been growing faster.  With the exception of South 
                                                 
6 The powerful dual economy models of development for example, critically assume a stagnant, traditional  rural sector 
from which labor and resources flow to the dynamic, modern industrial sector.  
7 Productivity estimates for the economy as a whole or for individual sectors on the other hand abound. 
8 To see this, denote GDP by Gk, and population in sector k by Lk,. Through total differentiation of 
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Asia, this holds across all continents, including Sub-Saharan Africa.  It further appears that overall 
GDP growth in agriculture has been largely driven by growth in agricultural productivity, while 
growth in the non-agricultural sector has been largely fueled by population growth in non-
agriculture especially in the developing countries (except Eastern Europe and Central Asia).   
Finally, while population growth has been the key contributor to overall growth in both sectors in 
SSA, agricultural productivity growth exceeded productivity growth in the non-agricultural sector.   
 
Table 2: Average agriculture and non-agricultural GDP, productivity and population
1) 
growth rates, 1960-2003 by continent 




















Sub-Saharan Africa  2.6  0.91  1.7  3.8  -0.64  4.5 
South Asia  2.9  1.2  1.6  5.8  2.2  3.6 
East Asia & Pacific  2.3  2.9  -0.5  5.7  2.7  2.9 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 
0.81 3.4  -2.5  2.6  1.4  1.2 
Europe, others  1.5  4.6  -3  2.9  2  0.87 
Latin America & the 
Caribbean 
2 2.3  -0.24  3.3  0.48  2.8 
Middle East & North Africa  4.4  4.3  0.21  4.7  0.26  4.4 
North America  1.7  3.9  -2.1  3  1.8  1.2 
Total 2.3  2.4  -0.05  3.9  0.74  3.1 
1) Figures for the total population in agriculture and non-agriculture were obtained from the FAO statistics. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank (2005c) and FAO data. 
 
Nonetheless, it is quite possible that the trends observed in Table 2 simply reflect 
equilibrating movements of labor out of agriculture into non-agriculture in response to higher 
marginal products of labor (and thus wages) in non-agriculture (a phenomenon also known as 
“industrial pull”).  This would lead to a convergence in sectoral labor productivity and is consistent 
with the observed faster (labor) productivity growth in agriculture.  The faster agricultural labor 
productivity growth is in this view a result of labor movements out of the sector (consistent with 
labor surplus in agriculture) rather than a result of an increase in agricultural output. 
Alternatively, if the observed agricultural labor productivity growth resulted from increased 
agricultural output, following investment and technological change in agriculture (or an increase in 
total factor productivity), productivity increases would free up labor in agriculture and induce it to     1 10 0
move to the non-agricultural sector (a phenomenon coined “agricultural push”).  According to this 
interpretation, the productivity gains in agriculture are the cause of the labor movements (and not 
its consequence).  Without additional evidence, the relative merits of the industrial pull versus the 
agricultural push hypothesis cannot be ascertained further.  Yet, while admittedly crude and partial, 
the descriptive findings in Table 2 are quite stark indicating that the hypothesis of agriculture as a 
backward sector with inherently inferior productivity growth deserves further scrutiny, and that it is 
quite likely that both forces (industrial pull and agricultural push) have been at work in the past. 
The limited available empirical evidence in the literature, mostly from industrialized 
countries, would support the hypothesis that total factor productivity (TFP) growth in agriculture 
does not lag behind total factor productivity growth in non-agriculture.  Estimating rates of sectoral 
TFP growth for the U.S. economy between 1948 and 1979 using a cost function approach 
Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987; table 6.7) found that TFP growth in agriculture had been 
more rapid than in almost all other sectors.  Examining historical TFP growth rates of agriculture 
vis-à-vis the rest of the economy in Australia using a production function approach Lewis, Martin 
and Savage (1988) come to a similar conclusion.  Using a sample of 14 industrialized countries 
between the early 1970s and the late 1980s Bernard and Jones (1996) estimated average TFP 
growth at 2.6 percent per year in agriculture compared with 1.2 percent in industry and 0.7 percent 
in services.  In only one of their 14 sample countries was total factor productivity growth higher in 
industry than in agriculture.  
But there is also evidence of a more productive agriculture from the developing world.  
Using a production function approach applied to panel data for about 50 low- and middle-income 
countries over the period 1967-2002, Martin and Mitra (2001) found on average total annual factor 
productivity growth in agriculture to be 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points larger than in non-agriculture, 
depending on the estimation technique.  This difference was statistically significant and valid 
across the development spectrum.      1 11 1
In sum, the historical evidence reviewed here questions the view of agriculture as a 
backward sector with limited inherent growth potential and thus a limited direct growth effect on 
poverty reduction.  While agriculture has been growing slower than non-agriculture, agricultural 
productivity appears to grow at least as fast as productivity in non-agriculture and a series of 
studies comparing productivity growth across both sectors suggest that this does not primarily 
follow from equilibrating labor movements in search for higher wages out of agriculture, but rather 
from a more rapid increase in TFP in agriculture per se.  A focus on increasing agricultural 
productivity to raise the direct growth effect of agriculture as a key building block of poverty 
reduction strategies therefore cannot be rejected off hand from this perspective. 
This does not imply that the agricultural sector as a whole should be expected to grow faster 
than the non-agricultural sector, or relatedly, that agriculture will increase its share in the economy.  
Engel’s law implies that as incomes rise, the demand for agricultural products increases at a slower 
rate than the demand for non-agricultural products, and hence the share of agriculture in total 
output declines.  This is consistent with the historical migration pattern between agriculture and 
non-agriculture observed in the data.  In other words, while the direct growth effect of agriculture 
on poverty reduction will likely continue to be smaller than this of non-agriculture, historical 
experience shows that agricultural productivity and growth can be substantially increased, an 
increase which has also been shown to be necessary to facilitate labor migration of labor out of 
agriculture (Gollin, Parente and Rogerson, 2003) and foster non-agricultural growth (Irz and Roe, 
2005).  
Nonetheless, despite faster productivity growth in agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa 
compared with non-agriculture, at 0.9 percent, agricultural (labor) productivity growth has 
historically been low, raising the question how agricultural growth in Sub-Saharan Africa could be 
increased, and at what cost.  A comprehensive treatment of this question falls beyond the scope of 
this paper, though in this context, the potential of investment in agricultural R&D and extension in 
increasing agricultural productivity is worth highlighting.  Thirtle, Lin, and Piesse (2003) estimated     1 12 2
the elasticity of yield with respect to R&D investment at 0.36 in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The 
InterAcademy Council (2004) also underscored the huge pay-offs from scaling up research in 
agriculture in their latest study “Realizing the Promise and Potential of African Agriculture”.  They 
further emphasized the critical need to address soil degradation and soil nutrient depletion 
especially in African soils.  Yet, given the limited technology adoption currently characterizing 
SSA agriculture, the role of policy and behavioral factors in adopting new technologies will also 
need to be much better understood. 
 
In addition to its direct sectoral contribution to overall growth, agricultural development can 
also play an important role in fostering development in the rest of the economy (Johnston and 
Mellor, 1961; Schultz, 1964).  Three broad types of mechanism were identified:  1) inter-sectoral 
linkages, forward to agro-processing activities and backward to input supply sectors (see Perry et 
al, 2005, for a recent assessment of these linkages);  2) final demand effects arising from a large and 
more affluent agricultural sector with a propensity to spend on locally produced non-traded goods 
and services (especially true of smallholder agriculture) generating significant demand for non-
agricultural goods (reviewed in Haggblade, Hammer and Hazel, 1991) and thereby off-farm 
employment; and 3) wage-good effects—by reducing the price of food, agricultural productivity 
growth would lower the real product wage in non agriculture, thereby raising profitability and 
investment.
9  Much of this literature argued that the stronger links were from agriculture to non-
agriculture rather than the other way around (Mellor, 1976; King and Byerlee, 1978; Thirtle, et al., 
2001).  In part this was because inputs into non-agriculture were more import intensive, and urban 
consumption patterns favored imported goods (the demand for food being income inelastic). 
                                                 
9  Lower food prices would also raise real consumption wages, and thus directly benefit poor (urban and rural) wage 
earners. 
4  Indirect Growth Effect—Interactions between Agriculture and the Rest of the 
Economy     1 13 3
Establishing the empirical validity of these linkages has been a ‘cottage industry since the 
early 1970s (Timmer, 2005).  While the models adopted in this literature typically embrace both 
production and consumption linkages,
10 it is the latter that have been found to be more important.  
Delgado et al. (1998) concluded that for both Africa and Asia, consumption-based agricultural 
growth linkages are four to five times more important to growth than production-based linkages.  
For the linkage effects to be significant, four conditions must apply (Delgado, et al., 1998).  First, 
agriculture must be a sufficiently large sector in employment terms for the income generating 
effects to be significant.  Second, the income gains from agricultural growth must be reasonably 
widespread, so that effective demand for locally produced goods and services is raised.  Third, the 
consumption patterns of people in agriculture must favor locally produced non-tradable goods.  
And finally, the non-agricultural (non-traded) sector must have to hand underutilized resources and 
appropriate institutional arrangements to be able to respond to the raised levels of demand coming 
from agricultural growth. 
  Using micro data on consumption patterns in five African countries, Delgado et al (1998) 
concluded that the farm sector in Africa is better able to propagate income growth than previously 
thought.  They estimated (p. xii) that ‘adding US$1.00 of new farm income potentially increases 
total income in the local economy by an additional $1.88 in Burkina Faso, $1.48 in Zambia, $1.24 
to $1.48 in two locations in Senegal, and $0.96 in Niger.’  Further corrected estimates to account 
for potential inelastic supply response of the non-tradable non-agricultural sector by the same 
authors, situate the agricultural multiplier effects around 1.6 for Asian countries and 1.1 for the 
African cases.  This difference is ascribed to the labor-abundant nature of the Asian economies, 
facilitating a larger supply response of the Asian non-tradable sector.  Similarly, using computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models applied to archetype economies for Africa, Asia and Latin 
America de Janvry and Sadoulet (2002) find the employment and overall linkage effects from 
                                                 
10  Production linkages refer to purchases and sales of intermediate goods between the sectors.  Consumption linkages 
occur when the incomes generated by growth in one sector lead to increases in final demands for the good of other 
sectors and as a result also increase employment in that sector.     1 14 4
increased land productivity in agriculture to be more important in Asia and Latin America where 
labor and food markets are better developed than in Africa.  
  More recent evidence by Dorosh and Haggblade (2003) applying both fixed price semi 
input-output (SIO) models as well as fully price endogenous CGE models to eight SSA countries 
confirms the existence of sizeable growth linkages from investments in agriculture—as before the 
indirect effects of investment induced growth prove to be about as large as the direct effects.  
Moreover, fixed price (SIO) multipliers from investments in export and food crops typically exceed 
the manufacturing multipliers, consistent with the literature, though they also find that this is no 
longer the case when prices of the non-tradables are endogenized (as in the CGE).  
  The methodologies (fixed price (semi) input-output models and price-endogenous CGE 
models) underpinning this micro evidence are structural in nature and data intensive.  While this 
constitutes the strength of these approaches providing a lot of insights in the nature and extent of 
the linkage effects, it also constitutes their weakness as the results (partly) depend on the validity of 
the structural assumptions.  To complement the empirical insights from the micro data we follow 
Bravo-Ortega and Lederman (2005), who focus on Latin America, and explore whether there exists 
evidence of a causal relationship between agricultural and non-agricultural output (in the Granger, 
1969, sense)
11 by applying dynamic panel data estimation techniques to international cross country 
data.  In doing so, we do not for example have to assume supply flexibility or fixed prices in the 
non-tradables sector, in effect observing a ‘reduced form’ of the full general equilibrium outcome.  
The downside of this “reduced form” approach is obviously that it does not provide much insight in 
the mechanisms of the linkage effects. 
  Bravo-Ortega and Lederman (2005) find evidence of a positive causal link (in the Granger, 
1969, sense) between (lagged) agricultural growth and non-agricultural growth, also for poor 
countries, though the effect is smaller for Latin America.  The reverse effect is also discernable—
lagged effect of non-agricultural output on agriculture, though this is negative for low-income 
                                                 
11 The concept of Granger causality holds that a variable Yai Granger causes Yni if Yni can be better predicted using 
lagged values of Yai than without them.     1 15 5
countries and only slightly positive (and not statistically significant) for Latin American countries.   
Although both the micro data and this cross-country evidence suggest that the linkage effects of 
agricultural growth appear to be true for Africa, the opening up of African economies might for 
example undermine the linkage effects from any expansion in rural demand (that demand possibly 
being increasingly met by imports).  We therefore update the data set examined by Bravo-Ortega 
and Lederman and revisit their results taking an African focus and using a somewhat modified 
specification. 
  In particular, in our specification non-agricultural GDP per capita (Y
n
it) in country i at time t 
is assumed to depend on both lagged levels of per capita non-agricultural GDP and lagged levels of 
per capita agricultural GDP. In addition, we consider a vector Xit of country-specific exogenous 




























1 0 γ γ γ γ      (5) 
 
where hi reflects unobserved country specific characteristics that determine the sectoral output, and 
vit a white noise error term.  Similarly, agricultural GDP per capita (Y
a
it) is expressed as a linear 
function of lagged agricultural and non-agricultural GDP per capita as well as observed and 
unobserved country specific exogenous explanatory factors.   
In the empirical application, we estimate the agricultural and non-agricultural equations 
separately, regressing non-agricultural (change in) GDP on lagged (changes in) agricultural and 
non-agricultural GDP and vice versa.  We introduce a time indicator to capture period-specific 
shocks common to all countries (e.g. global up or down turn of the economy) as exogenous variable 
in the non-agricultural regression and the yearly deviation from long run average rainfall in each 
country
12 as exogenous variable in agricultural regression.  The estimation employs the Arellano-
                                                 
12 The meteorological data have been constructed by Dr. T.D. Mitchell at the Tyndall for Climate Change Research. 
Based on a comprehensive set of high-resolution grid data of monthly climate indicators 1901-2000 (version TYN CY 
1.1), yearly means of precipitation and year-to-year variations are available for each country. For further information, 
see Mitchell et al. (2003) and http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/~timm/cty/obs/TYN_CY_1_1.html.  Bravo-Ortega and 
Lederman do not include rainfall shocks in their specification.      1 16 6
Bover system GMM estimator (1995) with the finite sample correction of the two-step standard 
errors proposed by Windmeijer (2005).
13  We use lagged differences of the predetermined variables 




it-k) in our levels equation and lagged 
levels of the predetermined variables as instruments for the first difference equation.
14 
The analysis utilizes 3-year averages of log per capita GDP over the period 1960-2004. For 
the estimations we exclude OECD-countries and countries from Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
The former have typically already passed through the structural transformation and the economic 
systems of the latter have undergone dramatic structural change over the past 15 years rendering 
their historical experience atypical of the remaining sample. The estimation sample consists of 106 
countries and 1489 observations, but missing observations on the GDP figures and the use of 
lagged dependent variables in the regressions lead to a reduction in the actual regression sample 
sizes. Sub-Saharan Africa is comparably well represented with almost half of all countries and 
observations in the sample.  
Table 3 reports the findings for the regressions of non-agricultural GDP.  Non-rejection of 
the reported 2nd-order autocorrelation tests indicates that the autocorrelation of the models is in 
general well-specified.
15 The Sargan-Hansen-tests are not rejected, providing confidence in our set 
of instruments.  As the linkage effects are also likely to differ depending on the stage in the 
structural transformation (see also Bravo-Ortega and Lederman, 2005), results are presented for the 
full sample (column 1) as well as for middle and low-income countries separately (columns 2-3 and 
4-5 respectively).
16  A Sub-Saharan Africa indicator variable is subsequently introduced to examine 
whether linkages in SSA differ from those observed in other low and middle-income countries 
respectively. 
                                                 
13 The use of estimated parameters for the construction of the weight matrix introduces extra variation and a difference 
between the finite sample and the usual asymptotic variance of the two-step GMM estimator.  Windmeijer (2005) 
shows that this difference can be estimated for a finite sample corrected estimate of the variance. 
14 A more detailed exposition of the specification and estimation strategy is provided in Appendix A1.  
15  The regressions are estimated in differences, and 1
st-order autocorrelation is therefore expected, while 2
nd-order 
autocorrelation is a sign of serial correlation in the levels.  Further lags in non-agricultural GDP were added in some 
specifications to adjust for serial correlation in the levels.  
16 To be consistent with the classification applied in the poverty regressions in section 5, we us the same cut-off value 
of US$ 1160 GDP per capita to classify countries.      1 17 7
The results in column (1) in Table 3 suggest a small positive effect of agriculture on non-
agriculture, though it is imprecisely estimated.   While it remains statistically insignificant when 
looking at the middle-income countries (column 2), it becomes larger and statistically significant 
for the low-income countries (column 4). Columns (3) and (5) introduce interaction terms of the 
GDP-variables with a SSA-indicator.  For the middle-income countries the SSA sub-group shows a 
higher effect of agriculture (sign. at the 11%-level), while agriculture does not appear to affect non-
agriculture in the SSA low-income countries (the coefficient on lagged agriculture and the 
interaction term basically cancel each other out). 
The corresponding regression results looking at the effect of lagged non-agricultural GDP 
levels on agricultural GDP are presented in Table 4.  As expected, rainfall shocks emerge as an 
important determinant of agricultural GDP, in particular in the low-income sub-sample. Yet we do 
not find any linkage effects from the non-agricultural sector to agriculture.  Note that while the 
Sub-Saharan African interaction term is significant, the effect of non-agricultural growth on the 
agricultural sector in SSA (calculated as the sum of the basic coefficient and the interaction 
coefficient, and tested with an F-test) is not significantly different fro m  z e r o  i n  a n y  o f  t h e  
regressions.  Overall, these findings are consistent with the view that development in agriculture 
(Granger) causes on average development in non-agriculture in low-income countries, though not 
in the middle-income countries.  We do not find evidence of a reverse effect. 
To conclude, the micro-evidence from structural models and the cross-country regressions 
indicate that the indirect effects from fostering growth in agriculture are on average substantial, 
even though they tend to be lower in SSA than those found for Asian and Latin American 
countries.  Second, while some recent evidence calls into question whether agricultural multipliers 
largely exceed the non-agricultural multipliers (Dorosh and Haggblade, 2003), virtually all studies 
(including the GMM analysis presented in this study) concur that the feedback effects from 
agriculture to non-agriculture are on average at least as large as the reverse effects. Finally, looking     1 18 8
beyond the averages, the exact magnitude of the sectoral multipliers is likely to differ across 
countries depending on their institutions and structure. 
 
Table 3: Dynamic Linkages of the Non-agricultural Sector 
   (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non Agricultural GDP 
per capita  Full sample    Middle inc Middle inc Low inc Low inc
Non-agr. GDP t-1  1.49   1.28 1.27 0.928 0.803
  0.000   0.000 0.000 0 0.000
Non-agr. GDPt-1 * DSSA       -0.18     0.227
       0.111     0.047
Non-agr. GDP t-2  -0.499   -0.261 -0.232      
  0.000   0.283 0.3629      
Non-agr. GDP t-3      -0.121 -0.117     
     0.425 0.4803      
Agr. GDP t-1  0.0407   -0.0818 -0.117 0.138 0.259
  0.209   0.172 0.0643 0.0639 0.0459
Agr. GDP t-1 * DSSA       0.256     -0.313
       0.1119     0.0267
Time dummies  Jointly sign.  Jointly sign. Jointly sign. Jointly sign. Jointly sign.
Constant  -0.0959   1.24 1.27 -0.188 -0.0163
  0.298   0.064 0.010 0.4204 0.9567
Observations  730    300 300 526 526
# of countries  104   42 42 74 74
# of instruments  81   60 60 72 72
P-value f/ no AR(1)  0.0000191   0.0487 0.0553 0.00142 0.00261
P-value f/ no AR(2)  0.695   0.0785 0.0889 0.864 0.94
Sargan test  0.185    0.992 0.989 0.281 0.588
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Table 4: Dynamic linkages of the agricultural sector 
   (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agricultural 
GDP/capita  Full sample  Middle inc Middle inc Low inc Low inc
Non-agr. GDP t-1  0.00956 -0.0329 -0.0386 -0.0449 0.0811
  0.489 0.230 0.154 0.240 0.101
Non-agr. GDPt-1 * DSSA    -0.0452   -0.148
   0.288 0.031
Non-agr. GDP t-2  -0.215 
 0.001 
Agr. GDP t-1  1.21 1.04 1 1.04 0.802
 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Agr. GDPt-1 * DSSA   0.0595 0.147
   0.354 0.077
Precipitation
1)  0. 0974  0. 0675 0. 0639 0. 2900 0. 2080
 0.077  0.230 0.357 0.000 0.005
Constant  -0.0527 0.0404 0.3 0.0725 0.54
 0.598  0.909 0.311 0.825 0.036
Observations  734 350 350 526 526
# of countries  104 44 44 74 74
# of instruments  81 50 74 50 50
P-value f/ no AR(1)  0.00204 0.0221 0.0236 0.00395 0.00294
P-value f/ no AR(2)  0.466 0.143 0.141 0.168 0.191
Sargan test  0.392 0.748 1.000 0.207 0.559
1) Deviation of actual rainfall (in mm)  in t from long run average (in mm), normalized by the country-specific standard 
deviation of rainfall, divided by 1000. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
There are several reasons why the contribution to poverty reduction from growth might 
differ across sectors.  First, connecting to the growth process might be easier for the poor if growth 
happens where the poor are located.  Indeed, much of the literature underscoring the importance of 
agriculture in poverty reduction has argued that the poor stand to benefit much more from an 
increase in agricultural incomes than from an increase in non-agricultural incomes because many of 
the poor live in rural areas and most of them earn their living in agriculture or agriculture related 
5  Participation Effect     2 20 0
activities.
17  This implicitly assumes that it is difficult to transfer income generated in one 
sector/location (e.g. people employed in industry or services in urban areas) to another 
sector/location (e.g. people employed in agriculture in rural areas).  This may be because of market 
segmentations or a political economic constellation unfavorable to redistribution.  Second, given 
that the major asset of poor people is usually their labor, differences in labor intensity across sectors 
might generate sectoral differences in poverty reduction from growth as emphasized by Loayza and 
Raddatz (2005).  Third, the distribution of other (complementary) assets (e.g. land in agriculture, 
capital in industry) may further affect the poverty reducing effect of growth in different sectors. 
Few studies have explicitly compared the GDP elasticities of poverty across the sectors.  
And some studies even hint that the GDP elasticities of non-agricultural sectors might be greater, 
contrary to what is often implicitly assumed.  Ravallion and Datt (1996) for example, find that the 
elasticity of rural headcount poverty with respect to agricultural growth in India is -0.9, compared 
with -2.4 for tertiary sector growth.  The latter they conjecture being attributable to growth in the 
informal sector.  For China however—and consistent with expectations—Ravallion and Chen 
(2004) estimated that agricultural growth has the greatest impact on poverty reduction (by a factor 
of 4 compared with the secondary and tertiary sectors) underscoring the existence of potentially 
important differences across countries in the participation effect depending on the structure and 
institutional organization of the economy.
18 
Inspired by this work and in the absence of good country time-series data, other authors 
have most recently compared GDP elasticities across sectors using cross country data.  Using five-
year panel data for the period 1960-2000, Bravo-Ortega and Lederman (2005) find that agricultural 
output per worker is not as effective as non-agricultural output in raising the incomes of the poorest 
quintile.  Quintiles 2 and 3 appear to gain most from increases in agricultural output.  Loayza and 
Raddatz (2005) argue that the labor intensity of the production process is a critical factor in 
determining the poverty reducing effect of growth.  Linking sectoral growth rates in different 
                                                 
17 For a more extensive review of this literature we refer to Timmer (2005) and Byerlee, Diao and Jackson (2005).  
18  Similar findings are reported for China by Fan et al (2005).     2 21 1
countries with data on the intensity of labor use in these sectors and the evolution of poverty, they 
conclude that growth in agriculture which is typically the most labor intensive sector, has also the 
largest potential to reduce poverty, followed by growth in manufacturing, construction and 
services; mining and utilities, which are usually very capital intensive, do not seem to help poverty 
reduction.   
Our particular interest here is in Africa and it is not clear that the somewhat cautionary 
findings of some of the authors on the agricultural GDP elasticity based on the country specific 
(Ravallion and Datt, 1996) or the cross-country evidence (Bravo-Ortega and Lederman, 2005) 
would apply in equal force to Africa.  Conditions in Africa are certainly different from the wider 
developing world, including India.  For example, a key determinant of how much poverty reduction 
is obtained from a given rate of growth is the initial income or consumption inequality.  The 
income or consumption distributions are found to be important in determining the GDP elasticity of 
poverty in part because they reflect other, possibly deeper-seated inequalities.  Ravallion (2001) has 
estimated that for countries with initial Gini coefficients of around 0.60 the GDP elasticity of 
poverty would typically be -1.2.  But if the initial Gini were 0.30, the expected GDP elasticity 
would be -2.1.  Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998) have shown that the difference in labor 
productivity in agriculture and non-agriculture is an important factor in explaining differences in 
income inequality across countries.  In particular, the larger is the gap in labor productivity between 
agriculture and non-agriculture, the lower is the elasticity of poverty to growth.   
Although these estimates refer to overall income inequality, it is likely that differences in 
the Gini ratios between the sectors could be an indicator of the differences in the sectoral GDP 
elasticities of poverty (εk).  Of the assets that are important for production and income in rural 
Africa, perhaps land is central.  Economic growth in a rural economy in which there is little 
landlessness, and in which land is more equally distributed, would be expected to have a greater 
impact on poverty than where land is unequally distributed and there is pervasive landlessness, as 
for example in India.  Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998) find indeed that the larger is the share of     2 22 2
land cultivated by small and medium farmers, the lower is the observed income inequality, and thus 
the larger the effect of growth on poverty.  Similarly, the distribution of human capital can exert a 
profound effect on the poverty effect of growth.  If large sections of the rural population are 
uneducated and illiterate, it is unlikely that they will be able to benefit from growth.  In a similar 
vein, farmers who have little access to health services are also less likely to benefit from growth.  
Poor African farmers may also have limited access to other services, such as irrigation, roads and 
communications limiting their ability to participate in the growth process (Christiaensen, Demery, 
and Paternostro, 2005).  
In sum, unequal distribution of both private and public assets will influence how any given 
agricultural and non-agricultural growth rate will reduce poverty.  To further investigate the 
potential differential participation effects across the sectors and resolve some of the uncertainties 
concerning these relationships in the African context, we turn to the data and perform some cross-
country analysis.
19  An appropriate empirical specification to test whether the source of growth 
matters on average for its effect on poverty reduction can be derived from equation (4) as follows: 
it nit
n
nit n ait ait a it u Y s Y s P + Δ + Δ + = Δ ln ln ln 0 π π π        (6)   
where πj (j = 0, a, n) are parameters to be estimated and uit is assumed to be a white-noise error 
term.   
The rationale of this specification is that if we cannot reject the null hypothesis H0:  πa = πn, 
equation 6 collapses to a simple regression of the rate of poverty reduction on the rate of growth of 
GDP (see Ravallion and Datt, 1996; 2002, and Ravallion and Chen, 2004, for applications to India 
and China).  Under such circumstances, the sectoral composition of growth would not matter, and 
the debate about the advantages of fostering agriculture versus non-agriculture in alleviating 
poverty reduces to the question whether investments in agriculture yield faster overall economic 
growth (i.e. the direct and indirect effect combined) than investments in non-agriculture.  If on the 
                                                 
19 In doing so, we were not able to account explicitly for differences in inequality across sectors, as sectoral inequality 
measures are not systematically available and rural/urban inequality measures are incomplete proxies (Bourguignon 
and Morrisson, 1998).  Yet, we also performed estimations which explicitly accounted for variations in overall (as 
opposed to sectoral) inequality across countries in their systematic assessment.     2 23 3
other hand, the estimated (slope) coefficients in (6) are (statistically) significantly different across 
the sectors, the composition of growth would also be important for poverty reduction.  Note further 
that the intercept, which reflects the change in poverty in the absence of growth, could be 
interpreted as an estimate of the effect of the average change in income inequality during the time 
period under consideration.  
To estimate (6) we bring together poverty measures derived from nationally representative 
household surveys with data on economic growth by sector.  The poverty data here refer to spells of 
change in the poverty measures, the change being derived from two (comparable) household 
surveys in years  τ − t  and t.  For comparability all poverty estimates are based on the US$1 a day 
poverty benchmark.  The poverty data are part of the World Bank’s Povcal database (World Bank, 
2005d).  Table 5 provides an overview of these.
20  Poverty spells are available for 82 countries and 
the total number of spells amounts to 289 (73 percent of the sample countries have more than one 
spell).
21  Exclusion of 7 urban-only surveys and systematic elimination of outliers reduced the 
sample to 75 countries and 222 observations.
22   We use three common poverty measures (the 
headcount index, H, the poverty gap index, PG, and the squared poverty gap index, SPG).  Data on 
the GDP shares and per capita GDP growth for the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors are 
taken from World Bank (2005c). 
                                                 
20 Chen and Ravallion (2004) provide a descriptive analysis of the Povcal data; the table in appendix A2 provides an 
overview of the data used. 
21 While we did not weigh the spell observations by country population size, China and India, the most populous 
countries have the most spells in our sample, while other large countries such as Brazil and Indonesia tend to have more 
than one observation, indicating that our results are implicitly population weighted (albeit approximately). 
22 Observations with poverty changes exceeding |50%| were eliminated.  Observations dropped came largely from the 
richer eastern European countries with very low 1$ day poverty rates causing large relative (percentage) changes in 
poverty following small absolute (percentage point) changes in poverty.      2 24 4
Table 5: Data coverage of poverty spells 
Continent  # of countries  #of survey spells  % of  survey spells 






Sub-Saharan Africa  20  20  42  39  15  18 
South Asia  4  4  22  22  8  10 
East Asia & Pacific  8  8  47  43  17  19 
East Europe & Central Asia  23  16  68  28  24  13 
Latin America & the Caribbean  20  20  89  77  32  35 
Middle East & North Africa  7  7  14  13  5  6 
Total 82  75  282  222  100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Estimates of the parameters in equation 6 were obtained using ordinary least squares 
regression with suitable corrections of the standard error for heteroscedasticity across countries.
23  
The estimates were obtained for the three measures of poverty (H, PG and SPG), and are reported 
in Table 6.  We find that the cross-country data confirm the expectation that economic growth 
reduces poverty, the GDP elasticity of poverty increasing from -1.7 for the H measure to -2.0 for 
the PG measure and -2.2 for SPG (all of which are statistically significant—see panel A in Table 6) 
and comparable with earlier estimates by Ravallion (2001) and Adams (2004). 
The results also show that the composition of growth matters greatly for poverty reduction.  
The null hypothesis (that πa = πn) is rejected in most cases (panel B).  Taking the sample as a 
whole, πa is greater than πn by a wide margin.  For the headcount, it is over 9 times greater, and for 
the PG measure it is over 7 times greater, these differences being statistically significant.  However, 
while the estimated coefficient on agricultural growth for the SPG measure is still much larger than 
that on non-agriculture (by a factor of 6 times), this difference is no longer statistically significant 
(p-value > 0.1).  For SPG the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  In sum, agricultural growth 
contributes significantly more to poverty reduction across our sample of countries, at least as 
measured by the H and PG measures.  Whether the composition of growth matters for reducing 
extreme poverty (as reflected in the SPG measure), is less certain. 
                                                 
23 This is similar to other comparable approaches, for instance Ravallion and Datt (1996) and Adams (2004).      2 25 5
  Interestingly, the constant term is not significantly different from zero in most of the 
empirical specifications reported in Table 6.  With zero growth, poverty is predicted on average to 
remain unchanged, implying constancy on average in income/consumption inequality.
24  But for the 
SPG measure, the constant term is significantly negative, suggesting favorable changes at the 
bottom of the distribution.  There inequality changes appear to exert a downward pressure on 
poverty when there is no growth. 
To explore further whether the composition of growth matters for poverty reduction across 
the development spectrum, we split the sample in two groups of equal size based on the country’s 
GDP per capita and run separate regressions for the low and middle-income countries.
25  For the 
middle-income countries, the null hypothesis is rejected (see panel C of Table 6).  Agricultural 
growth has a significantly greater impact on poverty (πa being greater than πn by a factor of 13.8 for 
the H and 10.2 for the PG measure).  But as with the whole sample, the evidence of the differential 
impact of sectoral growth on the SPG measure is less certain.  While both the coefficients on 
agricultural and non-agricultural growth are statistically significant (at the 10% level), they are not 
statistically different, despite the fact that the coefficient on agricultural growth is 7.6 times larger 
than the one on non-agricultural growth.   
 
                                                 
24 We also applied a Gini correction to the GDP growth variables (following Ravallion, 1997) using initial year Ginis of 
each spell.  We obtained qualitatively very similar results to those reported in Table 6.  
25  Taking the pooled sample, this resulted in a cut-off of  US$ 1,160 GDP/capita.     2 26 6
Table 6 : Decomposition of poverty changes 
 All  countries  
Middle-income 
countries   Low-income  countries 
 
Coef 
ficient   p-value 
Coef-













 A  B    C    D  E 
Headcount index (H)                       
GDP/pc growth   -1.68  0.00  -      -      -    -   
Non agriculture pc growth      -0.98  0.05    -1.57  0.01    0.12  0.89  0.12  0.91 
Non-ag pc growth*SSA            -  -    -  -  -0.08  0.95 
Agriculture pc growth      -9.35  0.02    -21.74  0.00    -6.00  0.05  -12.95  0.06 
Agric pc growth*SSA            -  -    -  -  7.07  0.21 
Constant -0.05  0.27  -0.06  0.22    -0.07  0.43    -0.06  0.27  -0.03  0.55 
        
Number of observations  222    222      111      111    111   
R
2    0.08  0.14      0.26      0.10    0.13 
Ho:  test ag=nag        0.04      0.00      0.08    0.07 
Ho: test 
nag+nag*X=ag+ag*X            -      -    0.31 
        
Poverty gap index (PG)                       
GDP/pc growth   -2.03  0.00                  -   
Non agriculture pc growth      -1.32  0.04    -2.07  0.00    0.05  0.96  -0.05  0.98 
Non-ag pc growth*SSA      -      -  -    -  -  0.23  0.89 
Agriculture pc growth      -9.99  0.02    -21.15  0.01    -7.33  0.06  -9.99  0.14 
Agric pc growth*SSA      -      -  -    -  -  4.79  0.51 
Constant -0.10  0.11  -0.11  0.09    -0.13  0.16    -0.10  0.25  -0.07  0.39 
        
Number of observations  222    222      111      111    111   
R
2    0.07  0.10      0.18      0.08    0.09 
Ho:  test ag=nag        0.06      0.02      0.10    0.18 
Ho: test 
nag+nag*X=ag+ag*X          -  -    -  -    0.18 
        
Squared poverty gap index 
(SPG)                       
GDP/pc growth   -2.22  0,00                     
Non agriculture pc growth      -1.60  0.05    -2.36  0.02    -0.22  0.87  -0.51  0.80 
Non-ag pc growth*SSA      -      -  -    -  -  0.78  0.70 
Agriculture pc growth      -9.36  0.07    -18.00  0.10    -7.63  0.10  -8.29  0.33 
Agric pc growth*SSA      -      -      -  -  1.07  0.91 
Constant -0.15  0.05  -0.16  0.04    -0.20  0.10    -0.14  0.18  -0.12  0.26 
        
Number of observations  222    222      111      111    111   
R
2    0.05  0.06      0.09      0.06    0.06 
Ho:  test ag=nag        0.16    -  0.16      0.18    0.42 
Ho: test 
nag+nag*X=ag+ag*X          -  -     - -    0.13 
*10%, **5%,***1% significance  All estimations are corrected for heteroskedasticity with robust (cluster) 
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank data (2005c; 2005d) 
 
  However, in the low-income countries (for all measures of poverty—see panel D of Table 
6) only agricultural growth appears to affect poverty reduction—and the null hypothesis is therefore 
rejected.  The estimated effect of non-agricultural growth on poverty is not statistically     2 27 7
significant.
26  In this context it is especially worth highlighting how sectoral growth affects the 
poorest differently in the medium and low-income countries (as measured by changes in the SPG).  
While both agricultural and non-agricultural growth offer scope for extreme poverty reduction in 
the middle-income countries, it is only agricultural growth that appears to affect the poorest in the 
low-income countries.  This may suggest that the poorest groups in the middle-income countries are 
more likely to rely also on non-agricultural activities—possibly because extreme poverty is 
associated with landlessness and concentrated in urban areas as in many Latin American countries 
which make up more than 40 percent of our middle-income group.  This result also resonates 
somewhat with Bravo-Ortega and Lederman’s (2005) finding that growth in agricultural output per 
worker was slightly less effective as growth in non-agricultural output per worker in raising the 
incomes of the poorest quintile, at least where it concerns the middle-income countries. 
  Finally we consider the sectoral impacts in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.  Of the 
111 observations in our low-income sample, 36 are from SSA.  It is not clear, therefore, that the 
findings for the low-income group would necessarily apply to SSA.
27  It would not be appropriate 
to estimate the poverty regressions separately for SSA, given the small sample.  Our approach is to 
apply an SSA interaction term to the right-hand-side variables in the low-income country data.  The 
results are presented in panel E of Table 6.  As in case of the low-income countries, we find that 
only agricultural growth affects poverty reduction, while the estimated coefficients on non-
agricultural growth are not statistically different from zero, supporting the critical role of 
agricultural growth in poverty reduction in SSA.  None of the SSA interactive terms is statistically 
significant, indicating that the relationship between sectoral growth and poverty in low-income 
countries also applies to the Sub-Saharan-Africa group of countries covered in our sample. 
                                                 
26   The non-significance of non-agricultural growth for poverty reduction in low-income countries (and the positive 
sign on some of the estimated coefficients) might be the result of counteracting effects of growth within non-
agriculture.  Indeed, re-estimation of equation 6 using further disaggregated measures of non-agriculture into industrial 
and service growth, indicates that industrial growth is positively associated with poverty changes—it increases poverty, 
while service growth is negatively associated.  Yet, consistent with the results reported here, only the coefficient on 
agricultural growth is statistically significant and the coefficients on industrial and service growth are neither jointly 
nor individually statistically significant.  This holds across all poverty measures for the low-income countries.  Results 
are available upon request from the authors.    
27  Two countries—China and India— between them contribute 30 observations to the low-income country sample.     2 28 8
  The data reported in Table 6 give the response of total poverty to changes in the share 
weighted growth rates of the sectors.  Estimates of the participation effects for each sector can then 
be obtained by simply multiplying the estimated coefficients (columns B-D, Table 6) by the 
sectoral shares for each country.  The results (as averages per region) are reported in Table 7.  We 
find the participation effect of agricultural growth on average across the world to be 2.2 times 
(=1.72/0.80) larger than the participation effect of non-agriculture.  In other words, one percentage 
point additional growth in agricultural GDP per capita would reduce the poverty headcount on 
average 2.2 times more than an additional percentage point growth in non-agriculture GDP per 
capita.   
This broad finding lends support to a continued emphasis on fostering agricultural growth in 
reducing poverty especially given that the growth linkage effects from agriculture to non-
agriculture tend to be at least as large as the reverse feedback effects.  Moreover, historical 
evidence from both developed (Bernard and Jones, 1996) and developing (Martin and Mitra, 2001) 
countries indicating that agricultural productivity (as captured by TFP) has been growing at least as 
fast as non-agricultural productivity supports the view of agriculture as a dynamic sector with 
substantial growth potential which would help release labor from agriculture to non-agriculture.     2 29 9
Table 7: Decomposition of the participation effect of sectoral growth with respect to head 
count poverty into its share and elasticity components 
   Region   # of 
countries 
GDP share (%)  Estimated coefficient  Participation effect of 
growth on head count 
poverty 
       Agric  Nonag  Agric  Nonag
1) Agric  Non-agric
1) 
Low-income group            
   SSA 18  31  70  -6.00  -  -1.83  - 
   South Asia  4  29  71  -6.00  -  -1.73  - 
   East Asia & Pacific  6  24  76  -6.00  -  -1.44  - 
   Eastern & Central Europe  4  26  74  -6.00  -  -1.57  - 
   Latin America & Caribbean  4  19  82  -6.00  -  -1.11  - 
   Middle East & North Africa  2  15  85  -6.00  -  -0.92  - 
   ALL LOW-INCOME  38  27  73  -6.00  -  -1.60  - 
               
Middle-income            
   SSA
2) 2  4  97  -21.74  -1.57  -0.76  -1.52 
   South Asia  0              
   East Asia & Pacific  2  13  87  -21.74  -1.57  -2.76  -1.37 
   Eastern & Central Europe  12  10  91  -21.74  -1.57  -2.07  -1.42 
   Latin America & Caribbean  16  10  90  -21.74  -1.57  -2.13  -1.42 
   Middle East % North Africa  5  14  86  -21.74  -1.57  -3.07  -1.35 
   ALL MIDDLE-INCOME  37  10  90 -21.74 -1.57  -2.24 -1.41 
               
Pooled sample            
   SSA  20  28  72  -9.35  -0.98  -2.66  -0.70 
   South Asia  4  29  71  -9.35  -0.98  -2.70  -0.70 
   East Asia & Pacific  8  22  78  -9.35  -0.98  -2.03  -0.77 
   Eastern & Central Europe  16  14  86  -9.35  -0.98  -1.27  -0.85 
   Latin America & Caribbean  20  11  89  -9.35  -0.98  -1.03  -0.87 
   Middle East & North Africa  7  14  86  -9.35  -0.98  -1.34  -0.84 
   ALL POOLED  75  18  82  -9.35  -0.98  -1.72  -0.80 
1)  The estimated coefficients on the effect of (share weighted) non-agricultural growth in the low-income countries 
are not statistically significantly different from zero. 
2)  The two middle-income countries are Botswana and South Africa 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank data (2005c) 
 
  While an overall focus on fostering agricultural growth in reducing world poverty appears 
justified from the broad average perspective, the results in Table 7 also underscore the critical need 
to look beyond the averages and explore the size of the participation effect across regions and 
countries.  First, as discussed above, the elasticity of total poverty reduction with respect to sectoral 
GDP (i.e. the estimated coefficients) differs substantially between the middle and low-income 
countries where the effect of agricultural growth on overall poverty was found to be much more 
important.  Second, the larger the share of agriculture in the total economy the more important the 
participation effect from agriculture.  The combined effect of these two forces in the middle-income     3 30 0
countries results in the participation effect of agriculture on head count poverty being on average 
1.6 times (-2.24/-1.41) larger than that of non-agriculture, while it is on average multiple times 
larger in the low-income countries. 
 
From equations (4) and (6) we know that poverty reduction during a certain period can be 
decomposed into sectoral participation and growth effects.  We estimated the participation effects 
of the different sectors and concluded that one percent of agricultural growth yields on average 2.2 
times more poverty reduction than one percent growth in non-agriculture.  While agriculture could 
potentially grow faster, it is likely to continue to grow at a slower pace than non-agriculture due to 
Engel’s Law.  But the indirect effects of agricultural growth on non-agriculture are substantial and 
likely at least as large as the reverse feedback effects.  Whether investments in agriculture in a 
particular country would generate faster or slower overall economic growth than investments in 
non-agriculture is a priori not clear.  This would depend on the structure of the economy and the 
governing institutional arrangements.
28   
How these potentially counterbalancing forces (potentially slower overall growth from 
investments in agriculture against a much larger participation effect) play out, remains an empirical 
question.  To shed more light on this, we explore how agriculture and non-agriculture contributed 
to poverty reduction over the past two decades in the countries in our PovCal sample.  In particular, 
we revisit equation (6) and estimate the relative contribution of each sector to the (predicted) 
change in (US1$/day) poverty incidence in these countries.  To do so, we apply the estimated 
coefficients from the pooled data set reported in Table 6 column B to the (share weighted) sectoral 
GDP growth rates in our PovCal sample.  The poverty spells in our sample concern the 1980-2000 
period, with about two thirds of the spells occurring in the 1990s.  It is especially useful to examine 
                                                 
28 These two forces may further affect the country specific size of the participation effect as well, as will be discussed 
below. 
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the relative contribution of agriculture and non-agriculture to poverty reduction during this period, 
as it coincides with the increasing liberalization and globalization of the world economy.  These 
evolutions might affect the feedback effects of agriculture to non-agriculture, as well as the 
participation effects, if globalization induced a greater correlation between domestic and 
international food prices and a change in the farming structures through increased vertical 
integration.  The effect of non-agricultural growth and the constant (a measure of the effect of 
inequality change) is retained in the decomposition, even though their estimated coefficients are not 
statistically significant.  Observations where the share of a sector in poverty reduction exceeds |10| 
are excluded, resulting in a loss of nine observations (from 222 to 213). 
 
Table 8: Sectoral decomposition of changes in headcount poverty 
1) 
 







Agriculture  Inequality 
change 
Continent        
Sub-Saharan Africa  37  0.342 0.623  0.035 
South Asia  20  0.316 0.437  0.247 
East Asia & Pacific  43  0.430 0.215  0.355 
East Europe & Central Asia  27  0.378 0.451  0.171 
Latin America & the Caribbean  73  0.388 0.403  0.209 
Middle East & North Africa  13  0.593 -0.109  0.515 
Total  213  0.393 0.382  0.226 
Spells with sectoral shares exceeding |10| excluded. 
Bolded shares are based on statistically significant regression coefficients. 
Source:  authors’ calculations 
The results confirm that despite its slower (direct) growth record, agriculture played a major 
role in the evolution of poverty during the 1980-2000 period (Table 8).  On average just under 40 
percent of the change in poverty incidence across the world was attributable to growth in 
agricultural GDP—as much as growth in both industry and services combined.  Even so, this is 
likely an underestimate, as the decompositions are based on contemporaneous growth rates in 
agriculture and non-agriculture.  As a result, the contribution of agriculture to poverty reduction 
through its effect on growth in non-agriculture is attributed to the non-agricultural sector in this 
decomposition exercise.  To the extent that the indirect feedback effect from agriculture to non-    3 32 2
agriculture exceeds the feedback effect from non-agriculture to agriculture, the contribution from 
agriculture to poverty reduction will be underestimated.  In SSA two thirds of the predicted poverty 
change could be attributed to agriculture, underscoring the continuing critical importance of 
fostering agricultural growth in SSA for poverty reduction. 
While the evidence presented so far supports a focus on fostering agricultural growth as the 
starting point in designing poverty reducing strategies, especially in most low-income countries, 
there are differences to be expected in the size of the participation and indirect growth effects 
across countries depending not only on the share of the sector but also on the structure of the 
economy (e.g. equal versus unequal distribution of assets; a small open versus a large closed 
economy) and its institutional organization (e.g. functioning of labor and commodity markets).  Our 
inequality corrected estimates of the participation effects indicate for example that a 0.20 increase 
in the national Gini (corresponding roughly to the difference in equality between Ethiopia and 
Zambia) would decrease the participation effect of agriculture in low-income countries on average 
from -1.60 to -0.96.
29  Growth linkages on the other hand are likely to be smaller in small, open 
economies (such as Lesotho) with small elastically supplied non-tradable sectors, while countries 
such as Cameroon, Nigeria and Tanzania with large non-tradable agriculture and service sectors are 
likely to encounter large growth linkages from investments in tradables (Dorosh and Haggblade, 
2003). 
The choice of the agricultural technology (e.g. focused on non tradable food versus tradable 
export crops; land versus labor saving) and its targeting (small versus large farms) can also 
substantially affect the size of the participation and indirect growth effects of technological change 
on poverty.  Using CGE models applied to archetype economies de Janvry and Sadoulet (2002) 
emphasize for example that improvements in agricultural technology primarily affect poverty in 
SSA through their direct growth effects.  This suggests that technological change should focus on 
small farmer production system though with an appropriate balance in enhancing productivity 
                                                 
29 The coefficient on the share weighted Gini corrected agricultural and non-agricultural growth rates in low-income 
countries were estimated at -8,82 and -0,72 respectively, though the latter was not statistically significant.     3 33 3
among tradable crops (often export crops) and non-tradables (most often food staple crops) to avoid 
falling price effects.
30  In Asia on the other hand, where the landless account for an important share 
of the poor and the labor markets are much better developed, technological change for maximum 
employment creation (i.e. land saving and not labor saving technologies) is advised for maximal 
poverty reduction.  Benefits from agricultural technological change come mostly from linkage 
effects through the rest of the economy in Latin America, leading to the possibility that 
technological changes in the fields of large farmers can be more beneficial to the poor farmers than 
the direct effects derived from technological change on their own farm. 
 
To analyze the role of agriculture in poverty reduction, the paper developed a simple 
conceptual framework in which the relative contribution of a sector to poverty reduction is shown 
to depend on four factors: its direct (1) and indirect (2) growth effects as well as its elasticity of 
total poverty to sectoral growth (3) and the sector’s share in the overall economy (4) which together 
determine the sector’s participation effect.  Reviewing the evidence on the growth contributions of 
agriculture and the non-agricultural sector, it emerges that while the agricultural sector on average 
has grown more slowly than non-agriculture, this appears to be largely due to a migration out of 
agriculture into non-agriculture.  The latter could simply be due to equilibrating labor movements 
out of agriculture into non-agriculture in response to more productive opportunities in non-
agriculture (industrial pull).  Yet, the more rapid increase in agricultural TFP historically observed 
in both developed and developing countries lends support to the view of agriculture as a dynamic 
sector with substantial growth potential whereby productivity increases in agriculture induce labor 
to move out of agriculture (agricultural push). 
In addition, both the micro and the cross-country evidence indicate that the indirect or 
growth linkage effects from agriculture to non-agriculture appear quantitatively large and at least as 
                                                 
30  See World Bank (2005e) for a detailed discussion of this argument in Ethiopia. 
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large as the reverse feedback effect.  While the evidence further suggests that these indirect growth 
effects are likely to be smaller in SSA compared with the rest of the developing world, they appear 
nonetheless quantitatively important.  In sum, while the direct growth contribution of agriculture is 
on average likely to be smaller, this is often likely to be compensated by its contribution to non-
agriculture growth through the linkage effects which tends to be at least as large as the reverse 
feedback effect.  In evaluating the potential growth contribution to poverty reduction from 
investment in agriculture in a particular country, it is thus critical to account for both the 
contemporaneous direct effects as well as the lagged indirect effects.  
We find the participation effect from agriculture on the poverty head count on average to be 
2.2 times larger than the participation effect from non-agriculture.  This difference does not 
primarily follow from the large share of agriculture in these economies, but rather from the much 
larger elasticity of overall poverty to agricultural GDP than to non-agricultural GDP.  This also 
holds for the middle-income countries where the participation effect of agricultural growth on head 
count poverty is on average 1.6 times larger than that of the other sectors.  However, the poorest 
groups in these countries appear to be equally well served by growth in the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors.  The difference in participation by poor people in growth in agriculture versus 
growth in non-agriculture is especially pronounced in the low-income countries, with the poverty 
gains from growth in agriculture multiple times larger on average than those from growth in non-
agriculture, irrespective of the poverty measures used.  These results also hold for SSA. 
The much stronger participation effects from agriculture in low-income countries clearly 
outweigh its potentially lower contribution to overall growth, lending support to a concerted focus 
on fostering agricultural growth in reducing poverty in these countries (including SSA).  This is 
borne out by the more recent historical experience of the past two decades.  It is also consistent 
with the more forward looking in-depth country specific evidence from four Sub-Saharan countries 
by Dorosh and Haggblade (2003) who find that investments in agriculture favor the poor more than 
similar investments in manufacturing.  The evidence presented in this paper thus supports the     3 35 5
overall premise that enhancing agricultural productivity is a critical starting point in designing 
effective poverty reduction strategies, especially in low-income countries.   
This raises the question of how this can and should be achieved, especially in SSA, where 
agricultural productivity growth has been lagging.  While a comprehensive treatment of this 
question falls beyond the scope of this paper, we conclude highlighting the following three points.  
First, the debate about investment in agriculture versus non-agriculture is often misleading, 
especially when applied to rural areas, as many public investments (especially rural roads but also 
the provision of education and health services) are equally necessary for the development of the 
farming and the (rural) non-farming sector (Fan, Hazell, and Thorat, 2000).  Second, when it comes 
to agricultural specific interventions, the important potential of increased investment in agricultural 
R&D and extension, accounting for the great diversity of farming systems in SSA, cannot be 
sufficiently underscored.  Agriculture is typically an atomistic industry.  There are therefore few 
incentives for private investment in research.  Relatedly, given the limited use of technology in 
African agriculture, the role of policies, market access and behavioral factors in adopting new 
technologies must also be further explored. 
Third, the poverty reducing effect of different agricultural technologies and investments 
depends greatly on the structure and institutional organization of the economy.  Maximizing the 
poverty reducing effects of these investments thus requires in depth country specific understanding 
of the key features of the rural and urban economy (e.g. functioning of input, factor and commodity 
markets, proportion of net buyers of food staple crops, price and income elasticities of demand and 
supply of basic staple commodities).  Too many poverty reduction strategies are still being 
developed without a proper diagnostic of basic facts of the agricultural sector, the rural economy 
and its linkages with the rest of the economy as well as an articulation of the implications of these 
findings for developing agricultural and rural sector strategies with a maximum impact on poverty.   
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Appendix A1: Specification and estimation of agriculture and non-agriculture linkages 
  In particular, in our specification non-agricultural GDP per capita (Y
n
it) in country i at time t 
is assumed to depend on both levels of per capita non-agricultural GDP in previous periods as well 
as per capita agricultural GDP now
31 and in the past.  In addition, we consider a vector Xit of 
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where ci reflects unobserved country specific characteristics that determine the sectoral output, and 






















1 0      (A2) 
with fi a time invariant country-specific unobserved effect and ϕit a white noise error term.
32  The 
specifications (A1) and (A2) are assumed to capture the full correlations between (per capita) non-
agricultural and agricultural GDP, and  it ε  and  it ϕ  are therefore assumed to be uncorrelated.  
Equations (A1) and (A2) constitute our model of intersectoral growth linkages, where 
agricultural and non-agricultural GDP are interdependently determined in a dynamic process.   
Through the substitution of equation (A2) into equation (A1), we can obtain a reduced form 
expression for non-agricultural growth:  
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which can be further reduced to: 
                                                 
31 The level of contemporaneous agricultural GDP is included since a good agricultural harvest can induce an 
immediate higher agricultural demand for goods from the non-agricultural sector. 
32 Concurrent non-agricultural GDP is omitted on the right-hand side, as the agricultural cycle imposes a lagged effect 
of any non-agricultural stimuli to agricultural output growth. Increased demand for agricultural products can only lead 
to a higher agricultural production at the next harvest period.  We abstract from the potential increased demand for 




























1 0 γ γ γ γ      (A4) 
This single equation now constitutes a dynamic relationship between non-agricultural GDP and 
lagged levels of agricultural and non-agricultural GDP which we estimate in first differences and 
levels using the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator.  The lagged levels of non-
agricultural GDP are correlated with the unobserved country specific effects hi and OLS is 





























1 γ γ γ      (A5) 
The assumed feedback mechanism between changes in agricultural and non-agricultural 
GDP introduces another correlation between  it v Δ  and the lagged changes in agricultural and non-
agricultural GDP (
a
it Y 1 − Δ  and 
n
it Y 1 − Δ ).  To ensure consistent estimates we follow Arellano and Bover 
and use further lagged levels as instruments in the first difference equation (A5) and lagged 
differences to instrument 
a
it Y 1 −  and 
n
it Y 1 −  in the levels equation (A4) in effect assuming E(
a
it Y 1 − Δ , hi+ 
vit)=E(
n
it Y 1 − Δ , hi+ vit)=0 for t=3, …, T.  The additional moment conditions following from the level 
equation help address the potential problem of weak instruments, and thus low efficiency, that 
afflicts the Arellano-Bond estimation when the data generation process of the variables of interest 
approaches a unit root (Bond, 2002).   A reduced form along the lines of equations (A3-A5) can 
also be constructed for agricultural GDP(
a
it Y ) and its change (
a
it Y Δ ).     4 44 4
Appendix A2: Povcal data overview 
Headcount ($1)  Pov. gap ($1)  Pov. gap squ. ($1)  Gini  Country Spell 
Start End  Start End  Start  End  Start  End 
                  
Albania  1997-2002  0.62 0.23 0.07 0.04  0.02  0.04  29.12  28.14 
Algeria  1988-1995  1.75 1.16 0.64 0.24  0.49  0.09  40.14  35.33 
Argentina-Urban 1986-1992  0.29 0.09 0.17 0.01  0.20  0.00  44.51  45.35 
Argentina-Urban 1992-1996  0.09 1.14 0.01 0.18  0.00  0.05  45.35  48.58 
Argentina-Urban 1996-1998  1.14 7.69 0.18 3.61  0.05  2.27  48.58  52.82 
Argentina-Urban 1998-2001  7.69 3.33 3.61 0.48  2.27  0.09  52.82  52.24 
Azerbaijan  1995-2001  10.94 3.67 2.62 0.63  1.01  0.20  35.99  36.50 
Bangladesh  1984-1986  26.16  21.96 5.99 3.92  1.96  1.08  25.88  26.92 
Bangladesh  1986-1989  21.96  33.75 3.92 7.72  1.08  2.44  26.92  28.85 
Bangladesh  1989-1992  33.75  35.86 7.72 8.77  2.44  2.98  28.85  28.27 
Bangladesh  1992-1995.5 35.86  28.61 8.77 6.04  2.98  1.87  28.27  33.00 
Bangladesh  1995-2000  28.61  26.81 6.04 5.31  1.87  1.49  33.00  31.79 
Belarus  1988-1993  0.09 0.00 0.07 0.00  0.11  0.00  22.76  21.60 
Belarus  1993-1995  0.00 1.43 0.00 0.52  0.00  0.41  21.60  28.76 
Belarus  1995-1997  1.43 0.03 0.52 0.01  0.41  0.00  28.76  25.62 
Belarus  1997-1998  0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00  0.00  0.00  25.62  27.95 
Bolivia-Urban  1986-1991  20.08 5.68 6.17 0.76  2.50  0.14  51.68  42.04 
Bolivia  1997-1999  20.43  14.38 9.66 5.35  6.09  2.68  58.46  44.68 
Botswana 1986-1994  33.30  30.66  12.54  12.72  6.09  6.89  54.21  66.70 
Brazil  1981-1984  11.80  15.21 2.97 4.09  0.99  1.44  57.57  57.88 
Brazil  1984-1985  15.21  15.75 4.09 4.64  1.44  1.79  57.88  59.52 
Brazil  1985-1987  15.75  11.90 4.64 3.36  1.79  1.25  59.52  59.31 
Brazil  1987-1989  11.90 9.00 3.36 2.01  1.25  0.59  59.31  63.42 
Brazil  1989-1990  9.00  14.04 2.01 4.27  0.59  1.70  63.42  60.68 
Brazil  1990-1993  14.04 8.27 4.27 2.01  1.70  0.65  60.68  59.82 
Brazil  1993-1995  8.27  10.53 2.01 3.88  0.65  1.88  59.82  61.51 
Brazil  1995-1996  10.53 6.86 3.88 1.37  1.88  0.36  61.51  59.98 
Brazil  1996-1997  6.86 8.96 1.37 2.09  0.36  0.65  59.98  59.05 
Brazil  1997-1998  8.96 9.94 2.09 3.15  0.65  1.32  59.05  60.66 
Brazil  1998-2001  9.94 8.17 3.15 2.09  1.32  0.71  60.66  59.25 
Bulgaria  1989-1994  0.05 0.29 0.06 0.23  0.16  0.44  23.43  24.32 
Bulgaria  1992-1996  0.33 1.76 0.30 0.97  0.63  1.16  30.80  35.04 
Bulgaria  1994-1995  0.29 3.86 0.23 1.37  0.44  0.67  24.32  31.13 
Bulgaria  1995-1997  3.86 0.50 1.37 0.14  0.67  0.09  31.13  26.38 
Bulgaria  1997-2001  0.50 4.73 0.14 1.39  0.09  0.56  26.38  31.91 
Burkina Faso  1994-1998  51.41  44.85  19.52  14.42  9.28  6.27  50.71  46.85 
Burundi 1992-1998  45.24  54.56  13.83  22.69  5.66  12.67  33.33  42.39 
Cameroon  1996-2001  32.45  17.10 9.05 4.09  3.30  1.38  46.82  44.55 
Chile  1987-1989  6.20 4.92 1.01 1.09  0.22  0.40  56.43  57.88 
Chile  1989-1990  4.92 6.19 1.09 2.12  0.40  1.15  57.88  56.49 
Chile  1990-1992  6.19 1.15 2.12 0.20  1.15  0.06  56.49  55.75 
Chile  1992-1994  1.15 0.81 0.20 0.08  0.06  0.01  55.75  54.79 
Chile  1994-1996  0.81 0.00 0.08 0.00  0.01  0.00  54.79  57.47 
Chile  1996-1998  0.00 0.85 0.00 0.11  0.00  0.02  57.47  56.65 
Chile  1998-2000  0.85 0.97 0.11 0.18  0.02  0.06  56.65  57.61 
China  1981-1982  23.02  13.70 5.51 2.89  1.90  0.87  30.95  28.53 
China  1982-1983  13.70  10.48 2.89 1.96  0.87  0.52  28.53  28.28 
China  1983-1984  10.48 7.67 1.96 1.24  0.52  0.28  28.28  29.11 
China  1984-1985  7.67 6.78 1.24 1.13  0.28  0.27  29.11  28.95 
China  1985-1986  6.78 7.49 1.13 1.45  0.27  0.40  28.95  32.41     4 45 5
Headcount ($1)  Pov. gap ($1)  Pov. gap squ. ($1)  Gini  Country Spell 
Start End  Start End  Start  End  Start  End 
China  1986-1987  7.49 6.39 1.45 1.15  0.40  0.33  32.41  32.38 
China  1987-1988  6.39 6.13 1.15 1.04  0.33  0.31  32.38  33.01 
China  1988-1989  6.13 9.73 1.04 2.15  0.31  0.71  33.01  35.15 
China  1989-1990  9.73 7.96 2.15 1.45  0.71  0.41  35.15  34.85 
China  1990-1991  7.96 8.52 1.45 2.08  0.41  0.85  34.85  37.06 
China  1991-1992  8.52 7.13 2.08 1.61  0.85  0.63  37.06  39.01 
China  1992-1993  7.13 8.27 1.61 1.79  0.63  0.54  39.01  41.95 
China  1993-1994  8.27 7.58 1.79 2.00  0.54  0.74  41.95  43.31 
China  1994-1995  7.58 5.65 2.00 1.55  0.74  0.75  43.31  41.50 
China  1995-1996  5.65 2.97 1.55 0.81  0.75  0.42  41.50  39.75 
China  1996-1997  2.97 3.35 0.81 0.58  0.42  0.15  39.75  39.78 
China  1997-1998  3.35 2.16 0.58 0.24  0.15  0.04  39.78  40.33 
China  1998-1999  2.16 2.24 0.24 0.27  0.04  0.05  40.33  41.61 
China  1999-2000  2.24 3.34 0.27 0.64  0.05  0.18  41.61  43.82 
China  2000-2001  3.34 2.96 0.64 0.51  0.18  0.12  43.82  44.73 
Colombia  1980-1988  7.85 4.48 2.92 1.31  1.58  0.58  59.13  53.11 
Colombia  1988-1989  4.48 2.45 1.31 0.59  0.58  0.24  53.11  53.59 
Colombia  1989-1991  2.45 2.82 0.59 0.76  0.24  0.32  53.59  51.32 
Colombia  1991-1995  2.82 3.12 0.76 0.36  0.32  0.06  51.32  57.22 
Colombia  1995-1996  3.12 5.28 0.36 1.03  0.06  0.27  57.22  56.96 
Colombia  1996-1998  5.28 8.26 1.03 3.29  0.27  1.91  56.96  60.66 
Colombia  1998-1999  8.26 8.18 3.29 2.21  1.91  0.79  60.66  57.92 
Costa  Rica  1981-1986  14.81 7.32 5.91 3.16  3.17  1.87  47.49  34.48 
Costa  Rica  1986-1990  7.32 5.24 3.16 1.34  1.87  0.46  34.48  45.66 
Costa  Rica  1990-1993  5.24 4.11 1.34 1.36  0.46  0.74  45.66  46.28 
Costa  Rica  1993-1996  4.11 3.57 1.36 1.09  0.74  0.54  46.28  47.08 
Costa  Rica  1996-1997  3.57 1.85 1.09 0.51  0.54  0.25  47.08  45.88 
Costa  Rica  1997-1998  1.85 6.94 0.51 3.41  0.25  2.24  45.88  51.30 
Costa  Rica  1998-2000  6.94 2.01 3.41 0.66  2.24  0.39  51.30  46.60 
Cote  d'Ivoire  1985-1986  4.71 0.00 0.59 0.00  0.11  0.00  41.21  38.62 
Cote  d'Ivoire  1986-1987  0.00 3.28 0.00 0.34  0.00  0.06  38.62  40.43 
Cote  d'Ivoire  1987-1988  3.28 7.46 0.34 1.37  0.06  0.40  40.43  36.89 
Cote  d'Ivoire  1988-1993  7.46 9.88 1.37 1.86  0.40  0.55  36.89  36.91 
Cote  d'Ivoire  1993-1995  9.88  12.29 1.86 2.41  0.55  0.71  36.91  36.68 
Cote  d'Ivoire  1995-1998  12.29  15.53 2.41 3.82  0.71  1.42  36.68  43.75 
Croatia  1998-1999  0.07 0.23 0.07 0.24  0.15  0.54  26.82  27.71 
Croatia  1999-2000  0.23 0.09 0.24 0.06  0.54  0.09  27.71  31.33 
Croatia  2000-2001  0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05  0.09  0.06  31.33  31.10 
Czech  Republic  1988-1993  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  19.40  26.55 
Czech  Republic  1993-1996  0.00 0.12 0.00 0.24  0.00  1.05  26.55  25.82 
Dominican  Republic  1986-1989  8.61 3.85 2.89 0.55  1.46  0.12  47.78  50.46 
Dominican  Republic  1989-1992  3.85 1.55 0.55 0.55  0.12  0.38  50.46  51.36 
Dominican  Republic  1992-1996  1.55 1.76 0.55 0.38  0.38  0.14  51.36  48.71 
Dominican  Republic  1996-1998  1.76 0.00 0.38 0.00  0.14  0.00  48.71  47.44 
Ecuador  1994-1995  28.89  20.21 8.47 5.77  3.27  2.28  46.55  43.73 
Ecuador  1995-1998  20.21  15.00 5.77 5.97  2.28  3.42  43.73  53.39 
Egypt,  Arab  Rep. 1991-1995  3.97 2.58 0.53 0.31  0.13  0.07  32.00  32.60 
Egypt,  Arab  Rep. 1995-2000  2.58 3.08 0.31 0.42  0.07  0.11  32.60  34.41 
El Salvador  1989-1995  21.35  25.05  12.20  10.06  10.50  5.70  48.96  49.86 
El Salvador  1995-1996  25.05  25.26  10.06  10.35  5.70  5.79  49.86  52.25 
El Salvador  1996-1997  25.26  21.40  10.35  7.87  5.79  3.95  52.25  50.79 
El  Salvador  1997-1998  21.40  21.39 7.87 7.94  3.95  3.89  50.79  52.17 
El Salvador  1998-2000  21.39  31.07  7.94  14.07  3.89  8.57  52.17  53.27 
Estonia  1988-1993  0.05 0.98 0.05 0.40  0.09  0.34  22.97  39.50     4 46 6
Headcount ($1)  Pov. gap ($1)  Pov. gap squ. ($1)  Gini  Country Spell 
Start End  Start End  Start  End  Start  End 
Estonia  1995-1998  0.35 0.08 0.09 0.02  0.05  0.01  30.06  37.64 
Ethiopia  1982-1995  32.73  31.25 7.69 7.95  2.72  3.00  32.42  39.96 
Ethiopia  1995-2000  31.25  22.98 7.95 4.82  3.00  1.63  39.96  30.01 
Gambia 1992-1998  53.69  26.49  23.27  8.76  13.28  3.77  47.80  50.23 
Georgia  1996-1997  1.74 1.21 0.96 0.43  1.09  0.31  37.13  36.08 
Georgia  1997-1998  1.21 1.62 0.43 0.14  0.31  0.02  36.08  37.38 
Georgia  1998-1999  1.62 2.59 0.14 0.85  0.02  0.53  37.38  38.05 
Georgia  1999-2000  2.59 2.83 0.85 0.88  0.53  0.52  38.05  38.85 
Georgia  2000-2001  2.83 2.71 0.88 0.93  0.52  0.62  38.85  36.90 
Ghana 1988-1989  46.51  45.45  16.06  15.27  7.51  6.99  35.35  35.99 
Ghana 1989-1992  45.45  47.24  15.27  16.40  6.99  7.54  35.99  38.10 
Ghana 1992-1999  47.24  44.81  16.40  17.28  7.54  8.72  38.10  40.71 
Guatemala 1987-1989  47.04  34.85  22.47  16.84  13.63  10.49  58.26  59.60 
Guatemala 1989-2000  34.85  15.95  16.84  4.60  10.49  1.74  59.60  59.87 
Guyana  1993-1998  8.14 2.98 1.95 0.60  0.63  0.16  51.55  44.58 
Honduras 1986-1989  33.74  34.22  13.67  14.33  7.15  7.72  55.09  59.49 
Honduras 1989-1990  34.22  37.83  14.33  16.84  7.72  9.64  59.49  57.36 
Honduras 1990-1992  37.83  28.33  16.84  11.80  9.64  6.42  57.36  54.51 
Honduras 1992-1994  28.33  23.66  11.80  9.52  6.42  5.09  54.51  55.22 
Honduras  1994-1996  23.66  24.96 9.52 9.12  5.09  4.37  55.22  53.72 
Honduras 1996-1998  24.96  23.84  9.12  11.62  4.37  7.47  53.72  56.30 
Honduras 1998-1999  23.84  20.74  11.62  7.45  7.47  3.51  56.30  56.24 
Hungary  1987-1989  0.06 0.03 0.08 0.01  0.26  0.02  20.96  25.05 
Hungary  1989-1993  0.03 0.19 0.01 0.16  0.02  0.31  25.05  27.94 
Hungary  1993-1998  0.19 0.38 0.16 0.32  0.31  0.66  27.94  24.44 
India 1983-1986  52.70  48.29  16.32  14.23  6.83  5.75  32.06  33.68 
India 1986-1987  48.29  45.88  14.23  12.52  5.75  4.68  33.68  33.08 
India 1987-1988  45.88  49.45  12.52  14.05  4.68  5.39  33.08  32.93 
India 1988-1989  49.45  40.80  14.05  10.42  5.39  3.73  32.93  31.84 
India 1989-1990  40.80  42.06  10.42  11.09  3.73  4.04  31.84  31.21 
India 1990-1992  42.06  51.08  11.09  14.98  4.04  5.89  31.21  34.31 
India 1992-1994  51.08  45.13  14.98  12.04  5.89  4.41  34.31  31.52 
India 1994-1995  45.13  50.62  12.04  13.92  4.41  5.16  31.52  36.32 
India 1995-1996  50.62  41.85  13.92  10.44  5.16  3.61  36.32  32.86 
India 1996-1997  41.85  44.21  10.44  44.21  3.61  4.52  32.86  37.83 
India 1993-1999  42.13  35.60  10.81  8.45  3.87  2.74  31.52  32.46 
Indonesia 1984-1987  37.30  28.08  10.18  6.10  3.94  1.78  34.15  33.12 
Indonesia  1987-1990  28.15  20.62 6.10 3.93  1.78  1.05  33.12  33.18 
Indonesia  1990-1993  20.62  17.39 3.93 2.70  1.05  0.56  33.18  34.36 
Indonesia  1993-1996  17.39  13.93 2.70 2.16  0.56  0.49  34.36  36.45 
Indonesia  1996-1998  13.93  26.33 2.16 5.44  0.49  1.70  36.45  38.36 
Indonesia  1998-1999  26.33  14.74 5.44 2.29  1.70  0.54  38.36  31.73 
Indonesia  1999-2000  14.74 7.19 2.29 1.04  0.54  0.26  31.73  30.33 
Indonesia  2000-2002  7.19 7.51 1.04 0.91  0.26  0.18  30.33  34.30 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  1986-1990  1.53  1.61  0.32  0.44  0.12  0.23  47.42  43.60 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  1990-1994  1.61  0.49  0.44  0.11  0.23  0.05  43.60  43.00 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  1994-1998  0.49  0.26  0.11  0.04  0.05  0.01  43.00  44.10 
Jamaica  1988-1989  5.02 3.42 1.38 0.32  0.67  0.04  43.16  42.02 
Jamaica  1989-1990  3.42 7.72 0.32 3.28  0.04  1.96  42.02  32.90 
Jamaica  1990-1991  7.72 4.10 3.28 0.45  1.96  0.07  32.90  41.11 
Jamaica  1991-1992  4.10 6.65 0.45 1.03  0.07  0.24  41.11  38.39 
Jamaica  1992-1993  6.65 4.92 1.03 1.32  0.24  0.65  38.39  35.67 
Jamaica  1993-1996  4.92 3.15 1.32 0.74  0.65  0.33  35.67  36.43 
Jamaica  1996-1999  3.15 1.68 0.74 0.43  0.33  0.21  36.43  44.22     4 47 7
Headcount ($1)  Pov. gap ($1)  Pov. gap squ. ($1)  Gini  Country Spell 
Start End  Start End  Start  End  Start  End 
Jamaica  1999-2000  1.68 0.41 0.43 0.06  0.21  0.02  44.22  38.82 
Jordan  1987-1992  0.00 0.55 0.00 0.12  0.00  0.05  36.06  43.36 
Jordan  1992-1997  0.55 0.36 0.12 0.10  0.05  0.06  43.36  36.42 
Kazakhstan  1988-1993  0.02 0.37 0.01 0.00  0.01  0.00  25.74  32.65 
Kazakhstan  1996-2001  1.87 0.11 0.32 0.02  0.10  0.01  35.32  31.30 
Kenya 1992-1994  33.54  26.54  12.82  9.03  6.62  4.50  57.46  44.54 
Kenya  1994-1997  26.54  22.81 9.03 5.92  4.50  2.10  44.54  44.93 
Kyrgyz  Republic 1988-1996  0.00  19.90 0.00 9.62  0.00  6.19  26.01  52.30 
Kyrgyz  Republic 1993-1997  8.03 1.57 3.28 0.29  1.82  0.10  53.70  40.50 
Kyrgyz  Republic 1997-1998  1.57 0.22 0.29 0.02  0.10  0.01  40.50  35.98 
Kyrgyz  Republic 1998-1999  0.22 0.73 0.02 0.18  0.01  0.09  35.98  34.60 
Kyrgyz  Republic 1999-2000  0.73 1.97 0.18 0.21  0.09  0.04  34.60  30.27 
Kyrgyz  Republic 2000-2001  1.97 0.86 0.21 0.10  0.04  0.02  30.27  29.03 
Lao  PDR  1992-1997  7.75  26.33 1.00 6.30  0.23  2.24  30.40  37.00 
Latvia  1988-1993  0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00  0.14  0.00  22.49  26.99 
Latvia  1993-1995  0.00 1.56 0.00 1.28  0.00  2.46  26.99  30.99 
Latvia  1995-1996  1.56 0.94 1.28 0.08  2.46  0.01  30.99  31.60 
Latvia  1996-1997  0.94 1.06 0.08 0.11  0.01  0.01  31.60  31.69 
Lesotho 1987-1993  30.34  43.14  12.66  20.26  6.85  11.84  56.02  57.94 
Lesotho 1993-1995  43.14  36.43  20.26  18.98  11.84  12.42  57.94  63.16 
Lithuania 1988-1993  0.08 6.78 0.05 0.87  0.08  0.15  22.48  33.56 
Lithuania 1993-1994  6.78 5.90 0.87 1.14  0.15  0.30  33.56  37.33 
Lithuania 1996-1998  1.07 0.59 0.50 0.26  0.51  0.24  32.36  32.16 
Lithuania 1998-2000  0.59 0.53 0.26 0.18  0.24  0.13  32.16  31.85 
Madagascar 1980-1993  49.18  46.31  19.74  17.64  10.21  9.02  46.85  46.12 
Madagascar 1993-1997  46.31  58.22  17.64  23.47  9.02  12.00  46.12  45.97 
Madagascar 1997-1999  58.22  66.03  23.47  29.42  12.00  16.35  45.97  41.80 
Madagascar 1999-2001  66.03  61.03  29.42  27.90  16.35  15.70  41.80  47.45 
Malaysia  1984-1987  1.96 1.20 0.40 0.17  0.14  0.04  48.63  47.04 
Malaysia  1987-1989  1.20 0.93 0.17 0.14  0.04  0.04  47.04  46.17 
Malaysia  1989-1992  0.93 0.43 0.14 0.03  0.04  0.00  46.17  47.65 
Malaysia  1992-1995  0.43 1.03 0.03 0.11  0.00  0.02  47.65  48.52 
Malaysia  1995-1997  1.03 0.17 0.11 0.02  0.02  0.00  48.52  49.15 
Mali 1989-1994  16.46  72.29  3.92  37.39  1.40  23.09  36.51  50.50 
Mauritania 1987-1993  46.67  49.37  20.77  17.83  12.29  8.58  43.94  50.05 
Mauritania 1993-1995  49.37  29.45  17.83  9.48  8.58  4.33  50.05  37.33 
Mauritania  1995-1996  29.45  29.11 9.48 9.29  4.33  4.19  37.33  37.71 
Mauritania  1996-2000  29.11  25.93 9.29 7.56  4.19  2.95  37.71  39.03 
Mexico  1984-1989  13.95 8.32 3.38 2.54  1.09  1.15  46.26  55.14 
Mexico  1989-1992  8.32  15.77 2.54 4.13  1.15  1.43  55.14  50.31 
Mexico  1992-1995  15.77 8.39 4.13 2.39  1.43  1.00  50.31  53.73 
Mexico  1995-1996  8.39 6.46 2.39 1.51  1.00  0.53  53.73  51.86 
Mexico  1996-1998  6.46 7.98 1.51 2.07  0.53  0.75  51.86  53.11 
Moldova,  Rep.  1988-1992  0.00 7.33 0.00 1.35  0.00  0.33  24.14  34.32 
Moldova,  Rep.  1997-1998  1.86  19.77 0.41 5.72  0.18  2.48  30.99  37.77 
Moldova,  Rep.  1998-1999  19.77  32.24 5.72 9.93  2.48  4.32  37.77  36.86 
Moldova,  Rep.  1999-2001  32.24  21.78 9.93 5.67  4.32  2.22  36.86  36.18 
Mongolia  1995-1998  13.92  27.02 3.06 8.08  0.98  3.40  33.20  30.27 
Morocco  1985-1991  2.04 0.14 0.70 0.03  0.50  0.01  39.19  39.20 
Morocco  1991-1999  0.14 0.56 0.03 0.08  0.01  0.02  39.20  39.46 
Nicaragua 1993-1998  47.94  44.71  20.41  16.64  11.19  8.23  50.33  55.13 
Niger 1992-1995  41.73  60.56  12.46  33.96  5.29  23.73  36.10  50.61 
Nigeria 1986-1993  65.72  59.19  29.62  29.25  16.71  18.27  38.68  44.95 
Nigeria 1993-1997  59.19  70.24  29.25  34.93  18.27  21.24  44.95  50.56     4 48 8
Headcount ($1)  Pov. gap ($1)  Pov. gap squ. ($1)  Gini  Country Spell 
Start End  Start End  Start  End  Start  End 
Pakistan 1987-1990  49.63  47.76  14.84  14.57  6.04  6.04  33.35  33.23 
Pakistan 1990-1993  47.76  33.90  14.57  6.35  6.04  3.01  33.23  34.22 
Pakistan  1993-1997  33.90 6.82 8.45 0.99  3.01  0.27  34.22  27.43 
Pakistan  1997-1999  6.82  13.36 0.99 2.36  0.27  0.71  27.43  32.99 
Panama  1979-1989  0.00  11.81 0.00 5.39  0.00  3.26  48.74  56.57 
Panama  1989-1991  11.81  11.81 5.39 5.20  3.26  3.03  56.57  56.82 
Panama  1991-1995  11.81 7.38 5.20 2.57  3.03  1.19  56.82  57.06 
Panama  1995-1996  7.38 7.92 2.57 2.81  1.19  1.32  57.06  56.31 
Panama  1996-2000  7.92 7.20 2.81 2.28  1.32  0.95  56.31  56.56 
Paraguay  1990-1995  4.93  19.36 0.85 8.27  0.23  4.65  39.74  59.13 
Paraguay  1995-1997  19.36  16.50 8.27 8.21  4.65  5.40  59.13  57.72 
Paraguay  1997-1998  16.50  15.88 8.21 7.95  5.40  5.27  57.72  56.52 
Paraguay  1998-1999  15.88  14.86 7.95 6.80  5.27  4.26  56.52  56.85 
Peru  1986-1994  1.14 9.40 0.29 2.00  0.14  0.57  45.72  44.87 
Peru  1990-1996  1.35 8.88 0.48 3.02  0.34  1.65  43.87  46.24 
Peru  1996-2000  8.88  18.07 3.02 9.14  1.65  6.28  46.24  49.82 
Philippines  1985-1988  22.76  18.20 5.34 3.57  1.67  0.93  41.04  40.63 
Philippines  1988-1991  18.20  19.77 3.57 4.23  0.93  1.20  40.63  43.82 
Philippines  1991-1994  19.77  18.36 4.23 3.85  1.20  1.07  43.82  42.89 
Philippines  1994-1997  18.36  14.40 3.85 2.85  1.07  0.75  42.89  46.16 
Philippines  1997-2000  14.40  15.48 2.85 2.98  0.75  0.76  46.16  46.09 
Poland  1985-1987  0.21 0.16 0.14 0.10  0.20  0.13  25.16  25.53 
Poland  1987-1989  0.16 0.10 0.10 0.08  0.13  0.14  25.53  26.89 
Poland  1989-1998  0.10 0.46 0.08 0.25  0.14  0.30  26.89  31.60 
Poland  1993-1996  4.11 0.09 1.54 0.05  0.79  0.06  32.39  32.66 
Poland  1998-1999  0.46 0.61 0.25 0.54  0.30  1.05  31.60  32.90 
Romania  1989-1992  0.25 0.34 0.29 0.23  0.79  0.36  23.31  25.46 
Romania  1992-1994  0.34 2.81 0.23 0.76  0.36  0.43  25.46  28.20 
Romania  1998-2000  1.39 2.14 0.89 0.59  1.29  0.33  31.19  30.25 
Russian  Federation  1993-1996  6.08 6.97 1.17 1.70  0.30  0.56  48.34  46.15 
Russian  Federation  1996-1998  6.97  12.66 1.70 3.46  0.56  1.27  46.15  48.67 
Russian  Federation  1998-2000  12.66 6.14 3.46 1.19  1.27  0.31  48.67  45.62 
Senegal 1991-1994  45.38  22.32  19.96  5.68  11.18  2.14  54.14  41.28 
Slovak  Republic 1988-1992  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  19.54  19.49 
Slovak  Republic 1992-1996  0.00 0.49 0.00 0.06  0.00  0.01  19.49  25.81 
Slovenia  1987-1993  0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04  0.06  0.10  23.60  29.18 
South  Africa  1993-1995  10.02 6.28 1.42 0.56  0.27  0.07  59.33  56.59 
South  Africa  1995-2000  6.28  10.71 0.56 1.74  0.07  0.37  56.59  57.77 
Sri  Lanka  1985-1990  9.39 3.82 1.42 0.67  0.27  0.23  59.33  30.10 
Sri  Lanka  1990-1996  3.82 6.56 0.67 1.00  0.23  0.26  30.10  34.36 
Thailand  1981-1988  21.64  17.85 5.40 3.64  1.78  1.00  45.22  43.84 
Thailand  1988-1992  17.85 6.02 3.64 0.48  1.00  0.05  43.84  46.22 
Thailand  1992-1996  6.02 2.20 0.48 0.14  0.05  0.02  46.22  43.39 
Thailand  1996-1998  2.20 0.00 0.14 0.00  0.02  0.00  43.39  41.36 
Thailand  1998-1999  0.00 2.02 0.00 0.06  0.00  0.00  41.36  43.53 
Thailand  1999-2000  2.02 1.93 0.06 0.05  0.00  0.00  43.53  43.15 
Trinidad  and  Tobago  1988-1992  2.25 3.95 0.20 0.99  0.02  0.43  42.60  40.27 
Tunisia  1985-1990  1.67 1.26 0.34 0.33  0.13  0.17  43.43  40.24 
Tunisia  1990-1995  1.26 1.02 0.33 0.19  0.17  0.07  40.24  41.66 
Tunisia  1995-2000  1.02 0.32 0.19 0.07  0.07  0.03  41.66  40.81 
Turkey  1987-1994  1.49 2.35 0.36 0.55  0.18  0.24  43.57  41.53 
Turkey  1994-2000  2.35 0.87 0.55 0.21  0.24  0.10  41.53  40.03 
Turkmenistan  1988-1993  0.00  20.65 0.00 5.30  0.00  1.84  26.39  35.38 
Uganda 1989-1992  39.18  30.54  15.00  9.60  7.57  4.22  44.36  43.19     4 49 9
Headcount ($1)  Pov. gap ($1)  Pov. gap squ. ($1)  Gini  Country Spell 
Start End  Start End  Start  End  Start  End 
Uganda  1992-1996  30.54  23.68 9.60 5.95  4.22  2.16  43.19  37.40 
Uganda  1996-1999  23.68  26.85 5.95 7.74  2.16  3.20  37.40  43.11 
Ukraine  1988-1992  0.06 0.02 0.07 0.01  0.19  0.01  23.31  25.71 
Ukraine  1992-1999  0.02 2.92 0.01 0.62  0.01  0.26  25.71  28.96 
Ukraine  1995-1996  2.06 0.00 0.64 0.00  0.39  0.00  39.29  33.18 
Uruguay  1981-1989  0.91 0.58 0.50 0.34  0.56  0.40  43.65  42.33 
Uruguay  1989-1996  0.58 0.56 0.34 0.18  0.40  0.12  42.33  43.76 
Uruguay-Urban  1996-1998  0.56 0.61 0.18 0.20  0.12  0.12  43.76  45.18 
Uruguay-Urban  1998-2000  0.61 0.20 0.20 0.05  0.12  0.02  45.18  44.56 
Uzbekistan  1988-1993  0.00 3.28 0.00 0.46  0.00  0.11  24.95  33.27 
Uzbekistan  1998-2000  19.16  17.32 8.12 4.26  4.70  1.86  45.35  27.03 
Venezuela,  RB  1981-1987  7.52 6.60 1.46 1.04  0.38  0.22  55.82  53.45 
Venezuela,  RB  1987-1989  6.60 2.95 1.04 0.87  0.22  0.45  53.45  44.08 
Venezuela,  RB  1989-1993  2.95 2.66 0.87 0.58  0.45  0.22  44.08  41.68 
Venezuela,  RB  1993-1995  2.66 9.43 0.58 2.86  0.22  1.31  41.68  46.84 
Venezuela,  RB  1995-1996  9.43  14.69 2.86 5.62  1.31  3.17  46.84  48.79 
Venezuela,  RB  1996-1997  14.69 9.65 5.62 2.88  3.17  1.27  48.79  48.80 
Venezuela,  RB  1997-1998  9.65  14.31 2.88 6.58  1.27  4.08  48.80  49.53 
Vietnam  1993-1998  14.63 3.08 2.55 0.48  0.65  0.10  35.68  35.40 
Yemen,  Rep.  1992-1998  3.55  10.21 1.11 2.30  0.67  0.85  39.45  33.44 
Zambia 1991-1993  64.64  73.57  38.91  42.66  28.78  29.55  60.05  52.61 
Zambia 1993-1996  73.57  72.63  42.66  37.75  29.55  23.88  52.61  49.79 
Zambia 1996-1998  72.63  63.65  37.75  32.65  23.88  21.07  49.79  52.60 
Zimbabwe 1991-1995  33.32  56.12  8.96  24.17  3.34  13.04  39.42  50.12 
              
Note: Start- or end-years specified with a 0.5-digit were rounded up for the calculation of the spell length. 
 
 
 